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Review article
Unfitness to plead in England
and Wales: Historical development
and contemporary dilemmas
Penelope Brown1,2
Abstract
Fitness to plead refers to a criminal defendant’s ability to participate at trial. The purpose of fitness-to-plead laws is to
protect the rights of vulnerable individuals who are unable to defend themselves in court and to preserve natural justice
in the legal system while balancing the needs to see justice served and protection of the public. Early legal systems
treated mentally disordered defendants with leniency, but over time those found unfit to plead have been subjected to
indefinite incarceration, breaching their right to liberty while protecting their right to a fair trial. Conversely, the
threshold for being found unfit is high, and there are concerns that many unfit defendants are being unfairly subjected
to trial. The approaches to balancing the competing demands have changed over time and have led to confusing and
contradictory practices. In order to understand better how and why the current problems have come to exist, this
paper analyses the historical development of the legal framework for fitness to plead from Medieval England to the turn
of the 21st century. It isolates core dilemmas: (a) what the normative standard of fitness to plead is and whether the
current test for determining fitness adequately reflects this standard; (b) whether fitness to plead should be disability
neutral or whether unfitness requires the presence of a psychiatric diagnosis; and (c) how the courts should deal with
those found unfit to plead, including insuring against the deprivation of liberty of innocents while ensuring the public are
adequately protected.
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Introduction
Fitness to plead is a fundamental but under-researched
concept of criminal justice. It refers to a defendant’s
ability to understand and participate in the legal pro-
cesses within a criminal trial – a prerequisite of a fair
trial. It has long been recognised that some defendants
are not capable of so doing. Going ahead with trial
would be an abuse not only of their individual rights
but also of the rule of law.1 If a defendant cannot
properly defend themselves, it could lead to inaccurate
or unjust verdicts and, at worst, imprisonment for an
offence which they did not commit.
The purpose of the law on fitness to plead is twofold:
to balance the rights of vulnerable defendants with
public protection and to balance natural justice with
the need to see justice served. Any test for ‘unfitness’
should accurately and fairly distinguish those able to
participate meaningfully in trial from those who
cannot. At present, there are concerns in several
jurisdictions that it fails to serve this purpose, with
widespread consensus that many incapacitated defend-
ants are slipping through the net and unfairly facing
trial.2–7 Conversely, those who manage to meet the
high threshold for unfitness are often unduly subjected
to indefinite psychiatric detention, even when there is
no evidence that they have a mental disorder.
In 2008, the Law Commission of England and Wales
announced its intention to review fitness-to-plead law.
In 2010, it published the first paper identifying
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problems in the existing framework, including that the
test seems to overlook defendants’ abilities to make
autonomous decisions and is less stringent than the
civil test for decision-making capacity in the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 (MCA).8 Following an iterative
consultation, a final report and draft legislation pub-
lished in 2016 outlined a new capacity-based test which
potentially lowers the threshold for unfitness.9,10 The
recommendations have been broadly welcomed,11 but
are also challenged by a concurrent development in
human rights law.12 The United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD)
came into force in 2008 and requires member states to
‘recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects
of life’.13 Findings of unfitness are primarily only avail-
able to those lacking mental abilities, resulting, for this
group of defendants, in the denial of legal capacity on
an equal basis with others. There are suggestions that
fitness-to-plead laws and declarations of unfitness
should accordingly be abandoned altogether.14–16
The concept of fitness to plead dates back centuries,
and early English law forms the basis of procedures in
many common-law jurisdictions. The following narra-
tive explores how the judiciary in England and Wales
has balanced the competing demands of justice, public
protection and individual rights in assessing fitness to
plead and dealing with those found unfit, starting from
the 12th-century King’s Courts, through 19th- and
20th-century case law and statute, up to the turn of
the 21st century. While this paper does not critique
the recent proposed changes, including the influence
of the MCA and UNCRPD, it aims to isolate dilemmas
which emerged over time and led to concerns that the
law is unfit for purpose, namely: how ‘fit’ one need to
be to be fit to plead; whether mental disorder is neces-
sary for unfitness; and how those found unfit to face
trial should be dealt with.
Early origins of fitness to plead
The concepts of crime and punishment have existed
since civilised human life has been recorded, and
offenders with mental disorders have long been granted
special treatment in law. In the 4th century BC,
Aristotle considered the circumstances in which a
person may not be deemed culpable, which included
acting due to a mistaken belief caused by ‘madness’.17
Ancient Roman law viewed suffering from mental ill-
ness as punishment enough for criminal behaviour:
satis furore ipso puniter.18 In pre-Norman England, a
perpetrator unable to understand the nature of a crime
was deemed unable to form the necessary intention
required for guilt (mens rea), even if they had commit-
ted the criminal act (actus reus). Such ‘insane’
defendants were released to the care of their families
rather than punished.19
Trial by jury was introduced in England after the
Norman Conquest, and by the 13th century, the
King’s courts were established. Defendants were con-
fronted by their accuser before a jury decided whether
they should be held to account.20 A conviction led to
punishment, including forfeiture of property to the
Crown. The accused was required to say ‘guilty’ or
‘not guilty’ in reply to the indictment. If they could
not answer, then they could not be held answerable.
The legitimacy of the trial was called into question,21
and the courts had to deal with those who could not, or
would not, enter a plea. Such defendants were said to
‘stand mute’, and a jury was called on to establish
whether they were ‘mute of malice’ or ‘mute by the
visitation of God’.22 The former referred to malinger-
ing – wilfully withholding a plea if it appeared advan-
tageous. Malingerers were subjected to peine forte et
dure – starved and pressed under heavy stones until
they capitulated (or, in some cases, were crushed to
death).23 Those found mute by visitation were
deemed to unable to plead, and were excused from
trial and punishment. Mute by visitation was invari-
ably associated with mental disorder, about which
understanding was then embryonic and invariably
thought to be caused by demonic or holy influences.24
This was reflected in the archaic terms used: ‘idiots’
referred to those with a cognitive disorder from birth;
‘the insane’ was a broad description of those who
developed madness later in life, with ‘lunatics’ some-
times used to refer to those who alternated between
madness and lucidity; and ‘deaf mutes’ had speech
and hearing impediments, often without mental ill-
ness.24 All were conflated with the term ‘insanity’,
and all could lead to mute by visitation, hence unfitness
to plead.
Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
case law
From the early 18th century, an adversarial criminal
process evolved, and defendants took a more active
role at court. This, alongside the writings of Sir
Matthew Hale, shaped the development of fitness-to-
plead procedures.25 Hale, a 17th-century legal scholar
with a progressive grasp of mental disorder, was inter-
ested in the causal nexus, the behaviour caused by the
disorder, and rejected a status-based approach whereby
the mere presence of insanity would be enough to
render one unfit. He proposed a functional model
focusing on what defendants could do rather than
what they could not. He distinguished the ‘absolute
mad’, whom he viewed as exempt from criminal
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responsibility, from the partially insane who were
not.26 He disaggregated deaf-mutism from insanity
and submitted that deaf mutes should not be found
unfit unless they were also mentally defective. Hale
also viewed unfitness as temporary rather than a final
outcome, and suggested trials be postponed until the
insanity abated.23,27 Despite his influence, Hale’s
approach was not initially embraced by the courts.20
From the mid-18th century, Hale’s writings gained
prominence as fitness to plead became considered more
than just the ability to enter a plea.28 In 1756, Dyle was
charged with murder but appeared incapable of
‘attending to the evidence’.20 His lawyer could not
take instruction from him. The jury deemed him ‘not
of sound mind and memory’ and his trial did not pro-
ceed. In 1790, Frith was charged with high treason by
throwing a stone at a coach conveying King George
III. In considering fitness to plead, the Lord Chief
Justice declared ‘no man shall be called upon to
make his defence at a time when his mind is in that
situation as not to appear capable of so doing’.29 In
1830, Esther Dyson, a deaf mute, was charged with
murdering her child. Informed by Hale’s treatise,
the judge instructed the jury to consider ‘if they
were satisfied that the prisoner had not then, from
the defect of her faculties, intelligence enough to under-
stand the nature of the proceedings against her’.30
As Dyson could not challenge the jury or understand
proceedings, she was found ‘insane’, spared trial and
detained indefinitely.
The case of Pritchard 1836
Pritchard was a deaf mute indicted for bestiality, a cap-
ital offence.26 Due to communication deficits, he did
not enter a plea. He was found mute by visitation
but, when subsequently asked to answer to the indict-
ment, used a sign to indicate ‘not guilty’. The jury
decided he was now able to plead, but the judge,
Baron Alderson, suggested that simply being able to
plead did not equate to being fit to plead. Proposing
both a status-based and functional test, he asked the
jury to first find whether Pritchard was ‘sane or not’
and then consider three elements:
First, whether the prisoner is mute of malice or not;
secondly, whether he can plead to the indictment or
not; thirdly, whether he is of sufficient intellect to com-
prehend the course of proceedings on the trial, so as to
make a proper defence – to know that he might chal-
lenge any of you to whom he may object – and to
comprehend the details of the evidence.31
Pritchard’s ability to instruct counsel was not consid-
ered because access to legal advice was not routinely
available until later that century.22 This criterion arose
in Davies (1853), found unfit as he could not properly
instruct counsel due to mental illness,32 and was incor-
porated into the Pritchard test.
The Pritchard criteria were rapidly and repeatedly
adopted as the legal standard for fitness to plead, but
issues have arisen which challenge whether they justly
assess the abilities needed to participate in a trial. In
Pritchard, Alderson made insanity a necessary condi-
tion for unfitness before summarising the functional
abilities required for trial. But do these criteria reflect
the normative conditions necessary and sufficient for a
fair trial? Second, is it necessary to be insane to fail to
meet these conditions? Despite evidence suggesting he
was neither ‘insane’ nor unable to plead, Pritchard was
deemed unfit and then indefinitely detained. How,
therefore, does the law serve its purpose of protecting
natural justice and individual rights?
Issue 1: the ‘fitness’ threshold
The philosopher Anthony Duff describes the normative
dimensions of trial as much more than simply under-
standing the facts and entering a plea.21 A defendant is
called to answer not only to the charge but to the court,
the Crown, and to fellow citizens. The accusation is one
of criminal conduct, unlawful not just immoral; a con-
viction is not merely a finding of fact but condemnation
in the form of punishment. While basic cognitive and
intellectual capacities are required for the factual
dimensions, Duff proclaims these alone are not suffi-
cient for fitness to plead. To engage at trial properly,
the defendant must also understand the reasons not to
have done the deed, the moral, emotional and criminal
aspects of the act, and the prudential reasons for avoid-
ing punishment. An accused who cannot comprehend
the facts or communicate their wishes is clearly not fit
to plead. One who comprehends the facts but is not
‘rational’ and is unable to grasp the normative dimen-
sions should also be found unfit.1
Duff’s threshold for ‘fitness’ is high, and the extent
to which most individuals fulfil these dimensions,
regardless of mental disorder, is questionable. Many
defendants have only rudimentary understanding of
the adversarial process, and most require significant
assistance from lawyers.27 Duff does not consider the
abilities required to engage or refuse counsel, but these
are fundamental.
In his review of early cases of fitness to plead,
Grubin notes that the precedent set by Dyson and
Pritchard resulted in a test of cognitive and communi-
cative abilities, without considering rational thinking
and decision-making capacity.20 As we have seen, the
early formulations of the Pritchard test included an
ability to instruct counsel properly and to make
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a proper defence. But how should ‘proper’ be inter-
preted according to the normative standard for fitness?
Subsequent judgments have tended to ignore this
issue,33–35 as discussed below, focusing on the cognitive
dimensions and effectively lowering the standard
for fitness.
Peay has proposed an alternative list of ‘core com-
petencies’ underpinning the normative dimensions of
trial, fleshing out the Pritchard criteria to consider
the subtleties within each ability.27 The ability to
instruct counsel includes organisational skills, autono-
my in decision making and acknowledgement of impar-
tiality in the justice system; the ability to give evidence
comprises not only communication and language skills
(with or without the assistance), but also appreciation
of truth, false beliefs and lies, and an ability to speak
without displaying symptoms which could prejudice a
jury’s assessment of guilt. These competencies are argu-
ably easier to discern than Duff’s moral norms, but
they assume mental disorder is present in those found
unfit, for which special expertise would be needed. But
is there, or should there be, a diagnostic threshold or
causative nexus for unfitness as there is for incapacity
in civil settings according to the MCA?
Issue 2: the diagnostic threshold
The test for fitness to plead is often regarded as ‘dis-
ability neutral’.10 Yet, insanity has been enmeshed with
unfitness from the outset. It is arguable that for prac-
tical reasons, a diagnostic requirement for unfitness is
needed. Countless defendants would be deemed unfit if
Duff’s normative requirements for a fair trial were
applied literally. This dilemma was considered by
Hamblin Smith, a late-Victorian prison doctor
who questioned:
. . . how many prisoners are capable of making what
may reasonably be called a ‘proper defence’, or . . . of
giving proper instructions for their defence. But it is
clear that mere ignorance, or lack of education, or ordi-
nary stupidity, will not be enough to justify a verdict of
unfitness to plead.36
A diagnosis of ‘insanity’ was certainly an implicit
requirement for unfitness in early cases, but insanity
has been understood to mean different things over
time. Grubin blames early unfitness judgments for per-
petuating the broad definition of insanity which
encompassed other disorders such as low intellect and
communication deficits. The courts gave little consid-
eration to how insanity impacted on the Pritchard cri-
teria. The timing of the disorder was, however,
significant. ‘Insanity on arraignment’ was unfitness to
plead, and insanity at the time of the offence made the
defendant eligible for a ‘not guilty by reason of insan-
ity’ verdict.26 We now clearly differentiate the concepts
of fitness to plead and criminal responsibility, but ini-
tially the distinction was purely temporal. Insanity was
crudely defined by social norms and lay perceptions of
madness.26 The problem of coupling it with unfitness
with would barely have been evident when treatment
was not an option. It suited the early Victorian era,
where the legalistic attitude of detaining the mentally
ill prevailed and cases could be dealt with rapidly with-
out the need for a public trial.37,38 However, as soci-
ety’s response to madness shifted to medicalism and
treatment became a possibility, problems arose.
If unfitness to plead requires a diagnosis, who is best
placed to make it? Lawyers and doctors had differing
opinions. The former were suspicious of the latter, with
one judge quoted as saying (in 1888): ‘When trial by
medical men comes into vogue, well and good; but so
long as trial by jury is the law of the land, I will not
allow a medical man to be substituted for the jury’.39
Doctors, on the other hand, asserted that insanity
should ‘never be decided without medical evidence’.40
There were no medical experts in Pritchard, although
they were used in late 19th-century cases. When expert
witnesses were called, the ‘ultimate issue’ rule applied.
Medics could only report facts upon which opinions
relating to symptoms and diagnosis were formed.
They could not give an opinion on fitness to plead,
including the defendant’s abilities according to the
Pritchard criteria. Medical evidence was rarely con-
tested, suggesting a united medical and legal approach
to unfitness, but since medical evidence became man-
datory in 1991, marked differences in opinion between
psychiatry and the law have surfaced.
Pritchard was found unfit due to low intellect and
deaf-mutism, not mental disorder. These are not con-
ditions that require expert psychiatric evidence. A core
purpose of fitness-to-plead law is to protect any defen-
dant who cannot fairly participate in a trial, not only
those with a diagnosable disorder. Yet, psychiatry is
now heavily intertwined with fitness to plead, not
only in determining the issue but also in dealing with
the outcome.
Issue 3: the detention threshold
If unfitness is due to a medical disorder, then surely a
medical solution is required. Yet, for many years, the
only outcome was incarceration. In 1800, James
Hadfield attempted to assassinate King George III
and was acquitted on the grounds of insanity.41 To
protect the public from the criminally insane, the
Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 (CLA) was passed which
allowed the detention of those found unfit to plead and
those not guilty by reason of insanity. Detention was
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predominantly in prisons or Victorian asylums which
consisted primarily of restraint and sedation akin to
punishment.37 It is hard to see how being found unfit
was a protection of individual rights. The link between
insanity and unfitness was strong. Yet, there was no
consideration of a causal nexus, no investigation as to
whether detention was necessary and no contemplation
of treatment.
Fitness to plead in the 20th century
The 20th century was a time of considerable change in
psychiatry. Advances in the understanding and treat-
ment of mental disorder were heralded, and the archaic
concepts of ‘madness’ and ‘insanity’ disaggregated into
diagnostically distinct conditions. Sensory impairments
such as deaf-mutism were no longer considered mental
disorders, and intellectual impairments were separated
from mental illness. The Mental Health Act 1959
(MHA) granted increased powers for both controlling
and treating the mentally ill.42 Procedural issues relat-
ing to fitness to plead were clarified in case law and
statutory changes.
The issue of when unfitness should be raised was
first considered in R v Roberts [1953], a deaf mute
charged with murder.43 The defence, believing there
were grounds to support a ‘not guilty’ plea, were reluc-
tant to raise unfitness in the hope of an acquittal.
The prosecution insisted unfitness be tried first: if
found unfit, Roberts would be indefinitely detained.
The judge held that the general issue should be heard
first. Otherwise, it might result in ‘the grave injustice of
detaining as a criminal lunatic a man who was inno-
cent’. This was not followed in Beynon,44 where it was
held that fitness to plead should be tried before the
general issue, even if it were not raised by the prosecu-
tion or defence and even if it resulted in incarceration.
The judge described it as the court’s ‘duty’ to try the
issue of fitness to plead if the defendant appeared
insane, even though this paradoxically resulted in vio-
lation of the defendant’s rights.
In 1963, the Criminal Law Committee reviewed and
made recommendations to codify fitness-to-plead pro-
cedures,45 many of which were swiftly implemented in
the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (CP(I)A).
The CP(I)A clarified that unfitness could be raised by
the prosecution, who had to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the defendant is fit;35 the defence, who bear
the burden to prove unfitness on the balance of prob-
abilities;46 and the court, when the burden would be on
the prosecution to disprove unfitness.47 The issue had
to be raised as soon as it arose but could be postponed
until the opening of the case for the defence so that the
jury could return a verdict of acquittal if there was
insufficient evidence of guilt. It could be raised even
if the defendant entered a plea, and it was up to the
jury to determine unfitness.48
Confusingly, the CP(I)A introduced the term ‘under
disability in relation to a trial’ to describe unfitness.
This not only strengthened the status-based approach
to assessing fitness to plead, but also contributed to
disposals being targeted at those for whom a disability
was present. The only disposal that was considered was
psychiatric. Under the MHA, unfit defendants could
now be detained against their will in asylums or ‘special
hospitals’ under a hospital order which provided treat-
ment as well as public protection.49 But psychiatric care
was not always necessary or appropriate, especially in
cases of unfitness due to deaf-mutism. The committee
recommended the courts have discretion when impos-
ing hospital orders, but this was not written into stat-
ute. They also considered introducing a ‘Trial of Facts’
whereby the guilt of the accused could be probed using
the available evidence, despite the defendant being unfit
to plead. This would avoid the unacceptable scenario
of indefinite detention of an innocent person but was
rejected on the basis that it would be unacceptable to
try a person who has been found unfit. There was
already opportunity for acquittal if, following the pros-
ecution’s evidence, there was no case to answer. The
only option of dealing with an unfit defendant, other
than acquittal, remained indefinite hospital detention.
This disincentivised the defence to raise unfitness, other
than in murder trials where the alternative if found
guilty was the death penalty, and a steady decline in
the numbers found unfit ensued.50
Rather than balancing the core dilemmas of fitness
to plead, the CP(I)A represented a ‘blurred compro-
mise’ between medicalism and legalism.42 While it
sought to prevent the detention of innocents, it failed
to go far enough to protect individual rights. The only
realistic outcome of being found unfit – indefinite hos-
pitalisation – was decided by the courts rather than
clinicians, and was invariably not in the interests of
the accused. Admission had to occur within two
months of the order being made, and in the meantime,
the defendant could be held in a place of safety, pri-
marily prison. Once in hospital, the defendant fell
under the framework of the MHA 1959, and there
was no provision to appeal. It did not provide any
changes to the Pritchard criteria, for which it was
heavily criticised.51
In 1972, the Butler Committee carried out a further
review of the laws pertaining to mentally disordered
defendants. The guiding principle of the resultant
Butler Report was ‘treatment wherever possible’.52 To
address the problem of detaining an innocent but unfit
defendant, they recommended flexible disposal options,
as well as delaying the trial to enable the individual to
be restored to health. They developed the idea of a
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‘Trial of Facts’, and suggested that those found to have
‘done the act’ charged against them should be consid-
ered ‘guilty in all but name’ (as it would not be right to
find someone guilty when they have not had a full
trial). Those found not to have ‘done the act’ should
be discharged. They did not suggest a root and branch
reform of the law, and were criticised for failing to
recommend any changes to the Pritchard criteria.42,53
The report received a mixed reception, and many of the
recommendations were deemed too controversial for
immediate implementation.53,54
Reform in the late 20th century
In the 1970s and 1980s, many defendants were still
found unfit for reasons unrelated to mental illness,
including deafness and communication difficulties.55
Psychiatric detention was not only inappropriate, it
became unlawful. Under Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), deprivation
of liberty due to psychiatric detention is only permitted
if supported by objective medical expertise that there is
a mental disorder warranting confinement.56 Yet, there
was no provision for the court to distinguish between a
finding of unfitness and an appropriate disposal. In X v
UK, it was found that detention under the MHA 1959
contravened the right to liberty, as there was no access
to review by a judicial body.57 This triggered a com-
plete overhaul of mental-health legislation, which
resulted in the MHA 1983.58 This was heralded as a
major reform in the treatment of the mentally ill,59
emphasising patients’ rights, including the right to
appeal against detention. A tribunal now had the
power to discharge patients, even those detained by
the courts, providing it was satisfied that the criteria
for detention were no longer met. While this was an
improvement for unfit defendants, the rights of the
individual were often overshadowed by the need to
protect the public when appeals were heard.60
Furthermore, the only safeguard available to unfit
defendants remained hospitalisation, which defied the
principle of protecting individual rights within fitness-
to-plead procedures. Two cases in the 1980s highlight-
ed this paradox and prompted further reform.61
In 1985, Glen Pearson, a deaf mute with significant
learning disability, was charged with stealing five
pounds and three light bulbs.62 Pearson was found
unfit and to have done the act. Despite psychiatric
reports stating that he was not insane, the only
option was hospital order. A bed could not be imme-
diately identified. So, a ‘place of safety’ was found in
Lincoln Prison. Pearson was detained for three months,
and this caused a national outcry. In Parliament, the
procedure for dealing with unfitness was described
as being ‘as remorseless in its purpose as anything
out of a Greek tragedy’.63
The case and additional issues have been summar-
ised by Emmins.63 First, the court had no option but to
make a hospital order, despite it being evident that
Pearson did not fulfil the criteria for detention. Even
if he had, what was to be gained? His lack of intelli-
gence and deafness were not likely to respond to treat-
ment, and he did not pose a risk to others. Had he been
tried and found guilty, he probably would have been
given a fine. Second, it was apparent that there was no
option for unfit defendants to be remitted for trial if
their mental condition improves. This emerged in 1989,
when a policy to review fitness every six months for the
first two years of detention was introduced.64 Third,
when hospitalisation is not appropriate, there is no
other provision for protecting the public from unfit
defendants. Three months after Pearson was given a
restricted hospital order, he was discharged and went
to live with his parents. This would have been most
concerning if the charge against him was one which
put the public at a risk. The tribunal can and does
consider public safety when deciding whether to dis-
charge a restricted patient, but it remains under a
duty to discharge if the medical criteria for detention
are not met. Its decision cannot be overridden, and the
individual could not then be brought back to trial.
How could the public be protected in cases of unfitness
when hospital is inappropriate but there is significant
risk to others? In view of the fact that one purpose
of considering fitness to plead is to balance individual
rights with public protection, the legal framework
in England and Wales at the end of the 20th
century was failing to meet either of these compet-
ing demands.
How did this situation come about? Medicine had
progressed significantly, and there was now a nuanced
understanding of what had been previously been
clumped together as ‘insanity’, but this was not
reflected in the law. The MHA 1983 differentiated
between mental illness, mental impairment (or learning
disability) and psychopathic disorder, and considered
whether disorders were treatable when deciding to
admit a patient to hospital. Yet, the broad concept of
insanity from the time of Pritchard, now referred to as
‘under disability’, persisted in the fitness-to-plead
framework. Psychiatric hospitalisation of an unfit
defendant makes sense if that individual suffers from
a mental disorder, but unfitness per se is not a psychi-
atric condition.20 It does not require the presence of
mental disorder, and the Pritchard test detects unfitness
in those in whom there is none.50 Yet, if unfitness is
something for which only psychiatrists are qualified to
assess and only psychiatric disposals are available, then
the test for unfitness should better align with
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psychiatric thinking. However, a purely psychiatric
model would overlook other reasons why a defendant
cannot participate meaningfully in their trial, such as
intellectual immaturity. It would not accurately and
fairly distinguish those fit to plead from all those who
are not.
Returning to the 1980s, the dilemma of dealing with
an unfit but innocent defendant remained an issue
which the government was forced to address following
the case of Valerie Hodgson.65 Hodgson had severe
learning disabilities and lived with her father. One
day, she found him stabbed in the chest and confessed
to his murder. She was found unfit and detained in a
secure hospital for 14 months. It later transpired that
her nephew had carried out the stabbing.66 In response
to further outcry, the Home Office commissioned Prof
Ronnie Mackay to review all cases of unfitness in the
preceding decades. Mackay found a significant decline
in findings of unfitness in the years following the CP(I)
A.50 In 1989, only 11 cases were identified nationally.
Mackay also found that while many of the findings of
unfitness related to serious charges such as murder and
rape, almost a quarter were in minor cases. The
absence of establishing guilt and the prospect of indef-
inite detention were likely explanations for the reluc-
tance to raise the issue.
In 1991, the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and
Unfitness to Plead) Act was passed and amended the
CP(I)A. After previous stalled attempts, the ‘Trial of
Facts’ was finally introduced, allowing a jury to deter-
mine whether they are satisfied that the accused ‘did the
act or made the omission charged against him’. Unlike
a criminal trial, this hearing considers only actus reus,
not mens rea. If actus reus cannot be proven, then the
defendant is acquitted. For those found to have done
the act, the amendments now allowed the court to
order guardianship, supervision and treatment, or
even absolute discharge, as alternatives to a hospital
order. However, when the charge was murder, an
offence for which the sentence was fixed by law, a hos-
pital order with restrictions remained the only available
disposal following a finding of unfitness.
The flexible disposal options were much more sat-
isfactory, and the 1990s saw a marked upturn in find-
ings of unfitness from 13 cases in 1990 to 80 in
2000.55,67 The CP(I)A amendments also introduced
the requirement for medical evidence from two practi-
tioners (usually psychiatrists) to support a finding of
unfitness. Fitness to plead was increasingly becoming
a psychiatric issue in the eyes of the law, but as psy-
chiatry advanced into the 21st century, the test was
stuck in 18th-century precedent which did not make a
good fit.
Interpreting Pritchard
The Pritchard criteria continue to provide the accepted
test for fitness to plead to this day. The test is not
codified in statute but was expounded in the 2003
case of M (John) as assessing the defendant’s abilities
to understand the charges, decide whether to plead
guilty, exercise the right to challenge a juror, instruct
solicitors and counsel, follow the course of proceedings
and give evidence in his/her own defence.68
Despite no explicit diagnostic criterion, there
remains an implicit requirement that some form of dis-
ability is present for a finding of unfitness. In the first
unfitness case heard at the Court of Appeal, Emery, an
uneducated deaf mute, was deemed unable to under-
stand and follow proceedings, resulting in a finding of
unfitness and indefinite incarceration.69 His lawyer
appealed that there was no evidence of insanity in
terms of mental disorder. Therefore, the CLA should
not apply to him, and he should have been found fit.
The appeal was rejected. Lord Alderstone held ‘there
was no question of general insanity, but only of insan-
ity from the point of view of not understanding the
nature of the proceedings’. The broad diagnostic
threshold persists, as almost a century later, the judge
in R v M (John) directed the jury not only to consider
whether the defendant met the criteria listed above, but
also to be satisfied that he was ‘suffering from a dis-
ability which rendered him unfit’.68 The Law
Commission recently claimed that the Pritchard test
includes ‘no diagnostic requirement’,10 but case law
suggests there is not only a requirement for a diagnosis
for unfitness but also a causative nexus.
Whether disability is necessary for a finding of unfit-
ness is debatable; it is certainly not sufficient. The
threshold for unfitness depends on how the functional
criteria are read, in particular the interpretation of
‘proper’. A frequently cited example is the case of
Robertson,35 charged with murder having experienced
persecutory delusions that he was being poisoned.
He had a clear understanding of legal procedure, but
his delusions were thought to affect his ability to con-
duct his defence properly and led him to act ‘outside his
own best interests’. He was initially found unfit, but on
appeal, this finding was quashed: acting in one’s own
interests is not part of the criteria. But what about the
need to make a proper defence? Lord Parker reasoned
that Robertson had:
. . . a complete understanding of the legal proceedings
and all that is involved and, although he suffers from
delusions which at any moment might interfere with a
proper action on his part, that is not a matter which
should deprive him of his right of being tried.35
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A similar conclusion was reached in Berry who had
paranoid schizophrenia and was described as being in
a ‘grossly abnormal mental state’.34 A finding of unfit-
ness was overturned on appeal, as Berry was deemed
able to challenge jurors, instruct counsel, understand
the evidence and give evidence, without consideration
of whether he was acting rationally or in his best inter-
ests. Lord Lane noted that ‘a high degree of abnormal-
ity does not mean that the man is incapable of
following a trial or giving evidence or instructing coun-
sel and so on’. That such significant paranoia and delu-
sions do not lead to legal findings of unfitness is at odds
with how we now understand mental illness and mental
capacity. Psychosis does not necessarily affect basic
cognitive functions such as understanding evidence or
entering a plea in the same way that learning disability
can, but psychotic symptoms, especially delusions,
have been found to impact decision-making abilities
significantly in other settings.70 Hale understood this
in the 17th century. Baron Alderson’s formulation
required consideration of whether insanity affected
the ability to defend oneself properly. Yet, throughout
the following centuries, the courts relied on the more
cognitive abilities in the Pritchard test (intellect and
understanding), without considering how properly or
rationally the defendant can make decisions and act.
Indeed, the current widely accepted version of the
Pritchard test as laid out in M (John) has dropped
the term ‘proper’ altogether.68
The problem is compounded, as deficits in ‘cogni-
tive’ abilities are less treatable than symptoms of
mental illness such as delusions, paranoia and halluci-
nations. Hospital admission is appropriate if the pur-
pose is for treatment, rather than purely public
protection. Yet, the test for fitness to plead does not
consider this. It is counter-intuitive that psychiatrists
are called upon to give evidence, and psychiatric hos-
pitals are the mainstay for managing individuals whose
difficulties are with defending themselves at court
rather than mental disorder as defined by the MHA.
At the time of Pritchard, the concepts of autonomy and
best interests would not have held significance, but they
do now. However, the courts have repeatedly employed
a narrow, cognitive interpretation of the criteria, ren-
dering the threshold for unfitness high, arguably too
high for the 21st century.3
Human rights and fitness to plead
The turn of the 21st century saw the ECHR partially
incorporated into English law for the first time with the
passing of the Human Rights Act 1998. The need to
safeguard fundamental rights gained prominence, and
the fitness-to-plead framework came under scrutiny.71
Protecting the right to a fair trial (Article 6) and to
liberty (Article 5) are intrinsic to the purpose of con-
sidering fitness to plead, but there were significant con-
cerns that the procedure was failing on both counts.
Deprivation of liberty via psychiatric detention was
the most common disposal for defendants found unfit,
but only around half had mental illness.67 The remain-
der were diagnosed with mental impairment and a few
with communication deficits. While medical evidence
was now a requirement for a finding of unfitness, the
assessing doctors were not asked to consider the appro-
priateness of hospitalisation, and the judge had no
limits on deciding whether to impose a hospital
order.71 Yet, a hospital order for an individual with
no mental disorder would be incompatible with
Article 5. The inflexibility in murder cases raised par-
ticular concerns, as encapsulated by Mr Justice
Richards in 200172:
Those [Pritchard] criteria do not correspond directly to
the criteria for a mental disorder sufficiently serious to
warrant detention, and it may be possible for a person
to be found unfit to be tried without his suffering from
a mental disorder sufficiently serious to warrant deten-
tion. Yet once a person facing a charge of murder has
been found to be unfit to be tried, there is no further
consideration of his mental condition . . . If the jury
find . . . he did the act charged, it is mandatory for
the judge to make an admission order . . . The judge
cannot consider whether such an order is justified on
the medical evidence . . . This feature of the procedure
does raise the question whether detention is ‘arbitrary’
in the sense explained by the ECHR.73
Further changes were made to fitness-to-plead laws in
the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.74
The court must now apply the provisions of the MHA,
justifying detention on the grounds of mental disorder,
when making a hospital order after a finding of unfit-
ness, including in murder cases. If a patient later
becomes fit to plead, the Secretary of State is now
empowered to remit him for trial. Other changes
include removal of guardianship as a disposal option
and MHA provisions allowing the court to remand
unfit defendants to hospital for reports or treatment
prior to the final disposal. This raised the likelihood
of a defendant being able to undergo a full trial, sig-
nalling a shift towards valuing the right to exercise legal
capacity over the right to be protected from trial, which
has gained momentum with the UNCRPD.13
Conclusion
This journey through the history of fitness to plead
illustrates that while the centuries-old principle that
the mentally disordered require special legal treatment
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is unchanged, our understanding of how mental disor-
der impacts behaviour and how this can and should be
managed has progressed significantly over time. The
competing demands of individual rights versus public
protection and natural justice versus punishment have
carried different weight at different points in history.
The primacy of natural justice and treating the insane
with leniency gave way to the need for public protec-
tion following high-profile cases. The expansion of
Victorian asylums preceded improvements in condi-
tions and treatment for inpatients, and individual
rights were poorly served until at least the first iteration
of the MHA in 1959. Improvements in understanding
and treatment of mental disorder combined with the
ascendance of human rights legislation have tilted the
balance somewhat back in favour of individual rights.
However, the test for determining unfitness remains
problematic. It evolved in a piecemeal fashion without
due consideration of the normative abilities required at
trial. The law has bestowed a leading role to psychiatry
in determining and managing unfitness to plead, but
modern psychiatry and 18th-century case law do not
make a good fit. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
critique the proposals made by the Law Commission,
and until the law is changed, it is unclear how far any
new test will go to reconcile the legal framework for
fitness to plead with its intended purpose.
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